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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the 
premier center for health law, scholarship and policy.  Housed at Georgetown University Law 
Center, in the heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative 
solutions for the leading health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic 
diseases to health care financing and health systems.  The Institute, a joint project of the Law 
Center and School of Nursing and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable 
intellectual resources, including the School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics. 
 
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has 
been, and will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global, 
national, and local communities.  By contributing to a more powerful and deeper 
understanding of the multiple ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill 
Institute hopes to advance scholarship, research, and teaching that will encourage key decision-
makers in the public, private, and civil society sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for 
enabling more people in the United States and throughout the world to lead healthier lives. 
 
 Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon 
their graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys, 
physicians, nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many 
other private, public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor.  The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare 
graduates to engage in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care 
law and policy and to rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural, 
economic, scientific, and ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems. 
 
 Scholarship.  O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems, 
using a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond 
a narrow vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a 
scientific endeavor.   
 
 Reflective Problem-Solving.  For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes 
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between 
key policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent 
and knowledge that resides in academia. 
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OVERVIEW 
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM 
 
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern.  In order 
to address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President 
Obama and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health 
reform.  In any debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management, 
economic, and legal issues is likely to be raised.  Due to the diverse interests involved, these 
issues could lead to a series of high-stakes policy debates.  Therefore, it is critical that 
advocates of reform strategies anticipate such issues in order to decrease the likelihood that 
legally resolvable questions become barriers to substantive health reform.  In an effort to 
frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate, the 
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University and the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” project.  
 
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may 
arise in any upcoming federal health reform debate.  While other academic and research 
organizations are exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health 
reform, the O’Neill Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health 
reform.  The target audience includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key 
executive and legislative branch agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other 
key players.  This project attempts to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation 
by providing stakeholders a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health 
reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES  
 
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are recurring questions that are policy-
based and those that are legally-based.  Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and 
cannot be considered in isolation.  However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the 
distinction between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or 
prohibition.   
 
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of 
health reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for 
poverty level subsidies and cost-sharing for preventive services.  In contrast, legal issues are 
those involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution 
allows a certain congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict. 
 
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as 
those beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning 
with, “Can we…?”  The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular 
categories: 1) “Under the Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and 
regulations, can we now…?”; 3) “ Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?”  This 
final set of questions tends to be mixed questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.   
 
 
PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT 
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This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat 
of political debate.  This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems 
addressed are either soluble or avoidable.  Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a 
constructive activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.  
Consequently, it does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is 
it an attempt to provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.  
Furthermore, this project does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or 
make recommendations among them.  Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide 
policy makers, attorneys, and other key stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal 
issues relating to health reform and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available for 
resolving those questions.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES 
 
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press, 
and current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal 
health reform.  After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of 
over 50 legal issues was narrowed to ten.  An initial framing paper was drafted which identified 
these ten legal issues and briefly outlined the main components of each.  In May of 2008, a 
bipartisan consultation session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and 
framing of the legal issues.  The attendees of the consultation session included congressional 
staff, executive branch officials, advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide 
range of interests affected by health reform.  Feedback and analysis from this session further 
narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current 
law.   
 
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant 
reform proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made.  There are 
multiple other legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is 
adopted, the system changes.  In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for 
an immediate discussion of federal health reform.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
Actuarial underwriting or discrimination based on an individual’s health status is a business feature of 
the voluntary private insurance market. The term “discrimination” in this paper is not intended to 
convey the concept of unfair treatment, but rather how the insurance industry differentiates among 
individuals in designing and administering health insurance and employee health benefit products. 
Discrimination can occur at the point of enrollment, coverage design, or decisions regarding scope of 
coverage.  Several major federal laws aimed at regulating insurance discrimination based on health 
status focus at the point of enrollment.  However, because of multiple exceptions and loopholes, these 
laws offer relatively limited protections.  This paper provides a brief overview of discrimination 
practices, the federal law, and federal reform options to manage discriminatory practices in the 
insurance and employee health benefit markets. 
 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: 
Long-Term Solutions 
 Establish a nationwide group purchasing mechanism in which all residents could automatically be 
enrolled with opt-out provisions for those covered through employer-sponsored plans or with 
coverage through public programs such as Medicaid.  
 Require entities that sell health benefits products to meet minimum coverage standards such as a 
benefit design modeled after the Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan. Allow broader coverage 
through an exceptions process similar to that used in Medicare Part D in the case of individuals who 
need benefits different from or greater than that specified in the plan design and who can provide 
medical evidence to support the claim.   
 Require payment plans to take into account the higher level of care associated with treating 
individuals with complex underlying medical conditions and thereby avoid the refusal to treat more 
complex patients.  
 Amend Medicaid to create more explicit standards regarding provider payment levels. 
 Revise Medicaid to create coverage for benefits that are necessary to treat and manage serious and 
chronic health conditions whose treatment requires services and benefits not covered through the 
nationwide group purchasing pool. In this way, people who receive standard coverage through the 
pool could still obtain supplemental coverage for serious and chronic conditions through Medicaid.  
 
Interim Solutions 
Amend or Expand Existing Federal Laws 
 Expand HIPAA’s prohibition on pre-existing condition exclusions to apply to all persons seeking 
coverage, not just those with requisite “creditable coverage.” 
 Enact legislation to subsidize COBRA benefits and enable people to remain in an employer group. 
 Expand Medicaid to any child or adult unable to obtain coverage through the individual market. 
Expand Protections through Agency Regulations or Interpretation 
 Impose limits on the extent to which insurers and plans can impose treatment limits that 
differentiate between covered physical and mental health conditions.   
 Rigorously oversee state compliance with HIPAA’s non-discrimination and guaranteed issue 
requirements. 
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RELEVANT LAW: 
The following federal laws focus on addressing discrimination based on health status that occurs at the 
point of enrollment, but only tackle risk management techniques linked to coverage to a limited 
degree. 
 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits intentional and disparate impact discrimination in 
the form of lesser benefits based on race; and prohibits both greater charges and provision of 
lesser-value benefits based on sex.  
 Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) permits employers to offer older workers lesser 
health benefits through the use of an “equal benefit or equal cost” test. 
 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
prevent any employer-sponsored plan or public insurance program operating in either the group or 
individual market from refusing to enroll a qualified person with a disability. Title II of the ADA 
and Section 504 cover public and federally-assisted programs, but protections are limited to access 
to any coverage, rather than the quality of coverage.  As long as limitations on coverage are applied 
to all recipients, despite the fact that such limitations have a disproportionate impact on people with 
disabilities, they are upheld.  ADA contains an “insurance safe harbor” that protects risk 
classification as permissible activity and means that the ADA does not reach the content of 
insurance. 
 Health Insurance Portability and Accessibility Act (HIPAA) prohibits application of pre-
existing condition exclusions in group health insurance as long as the individual has had at least 18 
months of creditable coverage. But coverage design, as long as applied uniformly, can contain 
specific limitations and exclusions.  HIPAA allows employers or insurers to offer premium 
discounts or modified cost sharing in exchange for participation in a bona fide wellness program. 
 Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act (GINA) prohibits employee health benefit plans 
and insurers in both the group and individual markets from using genetic information to determine 
the level of premiums to be charged. 
 Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act applies to plans and products that cover mental 
health or substance abuse disorder benefits and requires parity in financial requirements 
(deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance) and treatment limitations (limits on number of visits 
and days of coverage) for mental and physical illness.   
 Newborns and Mothers Protection Act requires plans that offer hospital stays in connection with 
childbirth to provide a minimum stay following delivery. 
 Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act (WHCRA) applies to group health plans that provide 
mastectomy benefits and requires plans to cover breast reconstruction, prostheses, and other 
treatments addressing complications of a mastectomy. 
 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) establishes “full and fair hearing” 
provisions and standards for timeliness and conduct of internal appeals of health benefit denials. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
Congress has limited the use of actuarial techniques that exclude persons from group insurance 
altogether. However, Congress has only modestly tackled risk management techniques linked to the 
actual content and administration of coverage. The use of discriminatory practices based on health 
status to limit coverage is especially apparent in the individual insurance market. If the federal 
government wishes to move in the direction of sharing health risks more broadly, next steps will 
include creating larger risk-pooling groups and curbing the ability of insurers to limit adequate 
coverage based on health status. 
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform: 
Insurance Discrimination on the Basis of Health Status: 
An Overview of Discrimination Practices, Federal Law and Federal Reform Options 
Sara Rosenbauma 
 
Introduction  
 
This is an important time to focus on the question of insurance discrimination based on health 
status.  The nation once again is poised to embark on a major health care reform debate; even as 
the number of uninsured stands at some 45 million persons, millions more may be poised to lose 
coverage during the worst economic downturn in generations.  In addition, a large number of 
persons may be seriously under-insured, with coverage falling significantly below the cost of 
necessary health care.  In recent years, the proportion of insured persons who are underinsured 
has grown by 60% since 2003, reaching an estimated 25 million persons in 2007.1  Health care 
costs experienced by insured persons now account for more than 75% of all personal 
bankruptcies related to medical care.2  Underlying these figures is a national approach to health 
care financing for the non-elderly that effectively increases the odds that those who are in poor 
health status will be uninsured or underinsured.3  Why this is so, and what to do about it, is the 
subject of this analysis, made timely by recent signals of openness on the part of the health 
insurance industry to address the problem of discrimination based on health status in exchange 
for universal and compulsory enrollment.4 
 
This paper, prepared for Legal Solutions in Health Reform, examines insurance discrimination 
based on health status.  As used in this analysis, the term “discrimination” is not intended to 
convey the concept of unfair treatment5; instead the term is intended to convey how society 
differentiates among the population in exposing individuals to financial risks associated with 
health care.  In the U.S., which has built its approach to health care financing largely according 
to market principles, the challenges to managing the system’s potential to discriminate against 
the sick are especially notable calling for incremental reforms that retain markets while 
introducing innovations into how financial risks are managed, not only at the entry point into 
enrollment, but also in how coverage itself is defined, structured and administered. The extent to 
which this differentiation is permitted – not only at the point of enrollment into coverage but also 
in relation to the design and administration of coverage – carries important implications for the 
nation’s ability to ensure  health care efficiency and equity.  To the extent that the American 
health care financing system is enabled – and indeed incentivized – to exclude the sick,6 the 
consequences extend beyond the ethical or moral.  Indeed, the consequences of discrimination in 
financing implicate the ultimate goal of any nation’s health care system, best summed up by the 
Institute of Medicine: safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable.7  All 
Americans, regardless of health status at any point in time, have a stake in how health care 
financing treats people in poorer health.  
 
This analysis begins with an overview of “actuarial fairness” and “social solidarity,” two 
concepts that represent opposing endpoints along the spectrum of possible approaches to the 
allocation of financial risk for health care across a population. The overview also discusses the 
tools used by insurers to shield themselves against persons with higher health risks.  Depending 
on where a particular health care financing system falls along this broad conceptual spectrum, 
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devising legal solutions to the problem of health status discrimination will pose a greater or 
lesser challenge.   
 
Following this overview, the analysis discusses a series of federal laws relevant to the issue of 
insurance discrimination based on health status.  These laws fall along various points of the anti-
discrimination policy spectrum, and offer relatively limited protections against discriminatory 
practices.  For example, group health benefit plans sponsored by state and local governments are 
exempt from laws regulating discrimination in private employer sponsored group health plans.8  
In addition, separate laws apply to coverage arrangements purchased by government sponsors 
such as Medicare and Medicaid, and a distinct body of law governs state-regulated health 
insurance sold in the individual insurance market.   
 
The paper also considers Medicaid’s continuing role in a reformed health care financing system. 
Medicaid-purchased coverage deserves special consideration because Medicaid’s enrollment and 
coverage features are related to its central purpose of covering individuals whose poor health and 
medical impoverishment virtually exclude them from the private health insurance market.9  In 
contrast to insurance markets, Medicaid coverage is available at the very point that serious health 
need arises.  The law contains no eligibility exclusions for pre-existing conditions; 10 many of its 
numerous eligibility categories are expressly designed to deal with coverage during illness;11 and 
states are required to provide for enrollment services in health care settings12 in order to enable 
enrollment at the point of health care need.  Medicaid coverage similarly is governed by 
principles of reasonableness that to a large degree bar the health status-based coverage 
distinctions that are a hallmark of private health insurance, in particular, the complete exclusion 
of certain health conditions from coverage.13  How Medicaid might be reconfigured in a health 
care system in which discrimination based on health status is mitigated will be discussed at 
greater length.  
 
The analysis concludes with a discussion of legal solutions to discrimination that focus on 
reforms aimed at preserving health insurance markets while limiting discrimination, in order to 
align health care financing more closely with the basic goals of a high performing health care 
system.  As described more thoroughly below, the individual market presumably would 
disappear under legal reforms proposed here, since the establishment of group purchasing 
arrangements can be a foundational legal step in mitigating discrimination. 
 
I. The Conceptual Starting Point: Defining the Concepts and Describing the Tools of 
Insurance Discrimination Based on Health Status 
 
Understanding insurance discrimination based on health status requires grounding in three sets of 
concepts.  The first is the concept of pooling: the assemblage of members into a group.  
 
The second set of concepts is found along the spectrum of strategic approaches to assigning risk 
within the pool.  At one end lies the concept of actuarial fairness (sometimes known as fair 
discrimination);14  and at the other end, the concept of social solidarity. Each concept represents 
a seminal vantage point from which to assess, manage and allocate costs associated with the 
financial risk of health care utilization by members of the pooled group.  
 
The third concept, which will be termed in this analysis as “discrimination tools,” is the 
mechanisms by which discrimination is accomplished by the health benefit services companies 
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that either assume risk through the sale of insurance products or manage risk for self insured 
group sponsors.  
 
A. Risk Pooling  
 
Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon, two of the nation’s leading experts in insurance law and theory, 
have written that insurance is the “paradigmatic risk spreading institution.”15  This act of risk 
spreading can occur in various ways.  At one end of the spectrum, the risks associated with poor 
health can be spread across an entire society.  For example, enrollment in the risk pool could be 
automatic for all U.S. residents, much in the way that working at a Social Security-insured job 
automatically leads to enrollment in the Social Security system.  Coverage could be financed 
through broad-based tax mechanisms as the financing mechanism.  European nations commonly 
rely on this social approach to achieving and maintaining coverage,16 and the Medicare program 
also possesses these characteristics.  
 
Alternatively, risks can be spread among small – voluntarily selected and selecting – groups.  
This is the case with private employer coverage, particularly coverage offered to small groups.  
(In truth, of course, even a large group employer is a small group when compared to society as a 
whole).  In this voluntary system, employers elect to offer coverage,17 employees elect to buy 
coverage for themselves and their families,18 and insurers elect to sell either insured or 
administered products in certain employer markets.  For example, some health benefit services 
companies may choose to sell small group insurance products in only certain states or may 
eschew the small group market entirely in favor of the non-risk administered products associated 
with larger employer groups. 
 
B.  Social Solidarity Versus Actuarial Fairness.  
 
How might the risk of loss be spread across a group?  Two concepts that lie at opposite ends of 
the risk spreading spectrum present two distinctly different ways to think about the act of 
spreading risk.  At one end is the “social solidarity”19 approach, which in its purest form spreads 
the cost of coverage equally across the entire group, a practice that is known as “community 
rating.”20 This practice subjects all to the same access to insurance, coverage rules and rates.   
Critics argue that under this practice, some, such as younger individuals with lower health risks, 
subsidize older individuals, which may keep them from signing up for the coverage itself. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum is what Baker and Simon call the “actuarial vision” of risk.21  In 
this model, which goes by the name “actuarial fairness,” actuarial science techniques are used to 
classify individuals by specific characteristics that in turn are associated with the use of care 
(health care experience) and thus, with the risk of financial loss to an insurer (known as medical 
loss).  Thus, underwriting is used to evaluate the risks posed by particular individuals and to 
adjust enrollment rules and premiums accordingly.22  Some individuals may be considered too 
big a risk to be permitted to enroll either at all, or without certain conditions, such as pre-existing 
condition exclusions designed to shield the group from health conditions present at the time of 
enrollment.  Other individuals may be allowed in, but charged disproportionately high 
premiums.23  
 
Risk shielding continues across the continuum of the insurance enterprise.  Thus, the insurer may 
design the benefit product to avoid certain types of conditions and treatments – particularly those 
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nt).   
that are costly and chronic – through the use of coverage limitations and exclusions.  High cost 
sharing may be imposed selectively.  Thus, the shielding process begins at the point of entry and 
proceeds throughout the terms of coverage.  
 
The concept of actuarial fairness and its resulting underwriting techniques can produce perverse 
results, particularly when classification of individual risk is based on immutable characteristics 
such as race, national origin, or sex.  For example, African Americans historically have been 
subjected to exclusions and higher premiums because of higher associated health costs,24 
therefore the use of tools to shield against risks posed by racial and ethnic minority members 
may be continuing.25  Similarly, women traditionally are charged higher health insurance 
premiums than men, because actuarial data tend to show that their health status and health care 
needs, at least during certain periods of their lives, may drive higher utilization rates.26  
 
C.  Specific Risk Shielding Tools 
 
Because Americans tend to pool in small groups (again, even a large employer is a small group 
when compared to society as a whole), there are relatively few persons over whom a health 
benefit services company can spread the financial risks associated with the use of health care.  In 
this regard, two types of health care costs must be considered: macro-level costs and micro-level 
costs.  Both types of costs affect the risk of loss, and for this reason, avoiding the financial losses 
associated with macro- and micro-level costs becomes part of the business of insurance.27  
Scores of judicial decisions that consider the “business of insurance” in the context of ERISA 
preemption underscore the broad range of design and management tools available to insurers and 
plan administrators to manage plans from financial risk.28 
 
Macro-level costs are associated with coverage design, that is, the benefits, limitations and 
exclusions, coverage definitions, deductible and cost sharing requirements, and the other terms 
of coverage that are embedded in the terms of coverage that apply to the group and  determine 
the scope of coverage that potentially will be made available to any member of the group.  Macro 
limits come in many shapes and forms. And focus on what classes of benefits to cover; whether 
the terms of coverage apply to treatments for certain conditions such as mental illness29 or 
HIV/AIDS;30 whether the coverage terms extend speech therapy only for persons who once 
spoke and have lost speech as the result of a stroke or  extend coverage to children whose 
inability to speech is connected with conditions present at birth;31 or whether certain classes of 
benefits will be included in a prescription drug formulary, and if not, whether to permit 
participants to seek an exception from the coverage restriction.32  If the terms of coverage 
expressly encompass conditions and treatments or at least do not exclude them, then these 
services become potentially available to members of the group and must be assigned an actuarial 
value.  This is because the very presence of covered items and services in the coverage 
agreement is characterized as creating a “moral hazard” (i.e., increasing the likelihood that 
insured persons will use the coverage potentially available to them).33  In this model, the need 
for health care essentially becomes the result of individual choice rather than health status (which 
by contrast is understood as the product of inherent traits, social environment, and behavior, 
which itself is shaped by the broader social environme 34
 
The second group of financial risks associated with the cost of health care consists of costs at the 
micro level of coverage, that is, at the level at which costs are actually incurred because a 
member is attempting to use benefits.  Thus, if a health insurance contract covers speech therapy, 
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treatments for mental illness and treatment for AIDS, the actual cost of care transpires when a 
particular patient makes use of the coverage in the receipt of care.  Thus, how an insurer 
conducts medical necessity reviews and whether an external appeal is allowed becomes a matter 
of financial risk to the group.35  In a similar vein, whether to offer a broad provider network36 
and whether and how to pay out-of-network providers in particular cases37 in turn will affect the 
level of financial risk to which an insurer is exposed, as well as the actuarial estimates related to 
costs and pricing.  
 
In sum, both macro- and micro- level risks are relevant when thinking about risk shielding tools.  
Certain risk shields happen at the preliminary enrollment phase while others occur throughout 
the coverage and management phases of the insurance enterprise. And the tools have an 
interactive relationship with one another.  For example, barring insurers from excluding people 
in poorer health status or putting conditions on their enrollment will in turn affect the level of 
financial risk to which the insurer is exposed. This fact will trigger the need for more back-end 
risk-shielding tools as part of coverage and management, including tools linked to benefit 
coverage design, cost sharing, and plan administration.  Indeed, the more that people in poor 
health are admitted into a pool without front-end restrictions, the greater the need for back-end 
risk shielding techniques (e.g., limitations on coverage and plan administration).   
 
Even before one gets to enrollment and coverage risk shields, a voluntary employment based 
system offers a number of relatively obvious ways to discriminate against poor health risks, such 
as marketing only to large employed groups or healthy smaller groups, a technique that offers 
companies the advantage of larger numbers and/or a relatively healthy self-selected group.  
Another obvious strategy is to use fixed, open enrollment periods in order to guard against 
adverse selection by eligible individuals who otherwise might seek to enroll only at the point of 
health care need.  
 
But these two threshold strategies have their limitations.  Even healthy workers can become sick, 
and certain qualifying events, such as divorce may trigger special enrollment periods at firms.  
Thus, companies must use back-end techniques linked to coverage itself in order to shield 
against health risks.  These risk shielding techniques can be clustered into two principal domains.  
The first domain is linked to membership in the group, that is, the ability to enroll and to do so 
without exclusionary terms to screen out pre-existing conditions, and at an affordable cost.  This 
domain encompasses several sub-domains: who is eligible to enroll, the restrictions that might be 
placed on enrollment, and the price that must be paid for membership in the group. 
  
The second domain consists of post-enrollment coverage techniques used to avoid financial risks 
associated with the use of health care services.  This domain likewise encompasses a series of 
sub-domains: benefit classes, service and treatment exclusions; contractual definitional terms; 
cost sharing including deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and payment maximums; provider 
network design, payment terms, and other structural considerations; and matters of plan 
administration such as utilization review, and a rapid and transparent appeals process.  
 
Again, these enrollment and coverage domains are highly interactive.  That is, they work 
together in various ways and are influenced by one another.  For this reason, regulations aimed at 
one domain, such as barring the use of pre-existing condition exclusions, can be expected to have 
spillover effects in the form of more aggressive coverage design and plan administration 
techniques.  Indeed, it is worth observing that the market interest in high deductible health plans 
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offering limited coverage coincided with the enactment of federal and state laws in the latter half 
of the 1990s prohibiting enrollment discrimination,38 along with the provider and consumer 
backlash against managed care.  
 
1. Enrollment-linked Tools  
 
The threshold strategy for health status discrimination is the avoidance of risk altogether by 
barring, preventing, or effectively constraining enrollment. As will be reviewed below, these 
techniques have received a somewhat greater level of attention in insurance reform laws enacted 
in recent years.  
 
 Barring enrollment by refusing to issue a product. An insurer might bar enrollment 
outright based on health status alone.  This type of absolute enrollment bar is a principal 
characteristic of the individual insurance market.  
 
 Medical underwriting to classify risks and adjust premiums. An insurer might use 
medical underwriting techniques to group risks by personal characteristics that could be 
expected to affect use of care.  Risk classification would permit the adjustment of 
premiums to reflect the level of financial risk perceived to be involved.  Individuals 
whose characteristics (both health status and personal characteristics that predict health 
status and insurance use) pose higher financial risks thus would be expected to pay a 
higher premium, and in some cases perhaps sufficiently high enough to render coverage 
unaffordable.  
 
 The use of pre-existing condition exclusions and waiting periods. An insurer might 
permit enrollment while imposing total exclusions for pre-existing conditions or waiting 
periods of modest to moderate length.  This would offer further protection against the 
assumption of risk by placing constraints on enrollment rather than barring enrollment 
altogether.  
 
 Coverage rescissions and cancellations.  Assuming that an individual is permitted to 
enroll, an insurer might cancel coverage in an ensuing benefit period or revoke coverage 
during the plan year in the event that the individual’s use of resources exceeds anticipated 
norms, and the insurer suspects the existence of fraud at the point of enrollment 
 
2. Post-enrollment Coverage and Plan Administration Risk Shielding Tools  
 
Assuming that enrollment occurs, a second issue arises, namely, how to manage risks associated 
with coverage and utilization of health care.  Several basic strategies exist: limiting the scope of 
coverage; high cost sharing; utilization management techniques and constraining challenges to 
coverage denials; and constraining the size and operation of provider networks and provider 
payment.  
 
 Limits on the amount, duration, or scope of coverage. Contractual limits on the amount, 
duration and scope of coverage (e.g., the classes of benefits offered, how covered benefit 
classes are defined, and the conditioning of coverage on certain applicable requirements) 
work to minimize the financial risks associated with coverage. For example, coverage of 
speech therapy to “restore speech” automatically excludes coverage for children born 
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 condition.      
e bill 
r their care.  
 more tightly controlled appeals system, and more restrictive 
networks with lower payments.  
with a developmental disability who need therapy to attain speech.39  Certain treatments 
for mental disorders or for HIV/AIDS could be radically limited or altogether excluded.40  
Similarly, embedded and undisclosed practice guidelines that limit available treatments 
for mental illness or addiction41 would shield risk by considerably narrowing the scope of 
an apparently covered benefit class for certain specified conditions. Along the same lines, 
a medical necessity standard that defines treatment as necessary only when restoration of 
previous functioning is possible automatically eliminates the potential for covering 
treatments whose medical purpose is to help a patient attain, maintain, or avert the loss of 
functioning.42  
 
 Cost sharing.  Insurers have a range of cost-sharing options, including across-the-board 
or condition- or treatment-specific deductibles, copayments and coinsurance.  Cost-
sharing can involve both covered services furnished by in-network providers as well as 
balance billing by out-of-network providers in the case of network plans.43  Plans might 
tier network cost sharing in order to use economic incentives (in the form of higher 
deductibles or copayments) to steer patients toward providers that are shown to be more 
“efficient” in their use of plan resources or that have offered a plan additional 
discounts.44  Similarly, insurers might impose annual or lifetime dollar limits on care 
either generally or by 45
 
 Utilization management and procedures for challenging coverage denials.  Insurers can 
use the case-by-case utilization review process to limit their risk exposure, drafting 
contracts so that they retain broad discretion over whether to approve coverage at all or to 
impose limitations on coverage (e.g., “in our discretion,” or “as determined by us”).46  
This discretion can extend to the power to determine the evidence that will be considered 
relevant47 along with the power to define an appeals process that favors the insurer.48  
Ultimately, because the burden of proof lies with the challenger in a coverage denial,49 
participants and beneficiaries may face an uphill fight.  
 
 Network size, composition and payment.  Network size matters in calculating financial 
risk.50  For this reason, limiting primary or specialty network size and composition 
affects utilization.  It also potentially deters product selection by individuals with serious 
and chronic conditions who fear limitations on their access to in-network providers.51  
Tiering provider networks based on performance or price offers an additional technique 
for shielding a company against risk.52  Similarly, restricting the scope of payable 
procedures and items within any covered benefit class and paying lower rates for certain 
covered services both help shield risk by constraining the flow of resources.  This 
practice may also have the effect of incentivizing providers to abandon network 
membership so that they can treat patients on an “out-of-network” basis and balanc
fo
 
It is important again to stress the interdependent nature of these techniques.  For example, 
regulations that limit the use of enrollment-related risk management tools can be expected to 
result in the use of higher deductibles and cost sharing, more tightly circumscribed coverage 
terms, more aggressive use of embedded practice guidelines, stricter utilization review in the 
case of high cost procedures, a
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II. Federal Efforts to Regulate Insurance Discrimination Based on Health Status 
 
Four major bodies of federal law regulate discrimination by health benefit service companies 
based on health status: civil rights laws; tax law; labor law; and laws that finance state public 
health activities.  Although federal laws that protect against insurance discrimination date back to 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress has shown a growing interest in recent years to make 
additional inroads on the issue of insurance discrimination based on health status.  At the same 
time, the materials that follow underscore the limited nature of these more recent laws.   
 
A.  Civil Rights Law  
 
Race. Most states outlaw the use of race-based classifications either directly or as a subset of 
prohibited unfair trade practices acts.53  But such a regulatory approach tends to be confined to 
laws that reach intentional discrimination and exclusion, not the disparate effects that stem from 
the facially neutral use of certain risk classifications.54 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
which reaches discrimination in both employment and the conditions of employment (including 
fringe benefits),55 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or national origin and bars 
both intentional and disparate impact discrimination (i.e., unintentional discrimination).56  Thus 
Title VII would be implicated in situations in which protected groups of individuals are exposed 
to less effective benefits as a result of risk classification.57  In addition, Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, which bars discrimination in federally assisted activities,58 has been interpreted as 
prohibiting public insurance administration practices that result in racially segregated health 
care.59  In addition, legislation implementing the Civil War Amendments has been interpreted as 
prohibiting the use of race as a classifier in private insurance contracts.60  
 
It may well be that the basis for the prohibition against the use of race as a classifier is not that 
race is not relevant to health risk; indeed, from an actuarial perspective, as in health services 
research, race may be significantly associated with poor health.  Instead, the prohibition appears 
to arise from the fact that a democratic society simply does not allow racial and ethnic minority 
individuals to be classified as poor risks and denied the benefits of insurance based on their 
immutable characteristics.61  In this sense, the rejection of race as a permissible risk classifier for 
purposes of enrollment or coverage represents perhaps the purest example of the trumping of 
actuarial fairness by social solidarity. 
 
Sex. Less consensus exists where risk classification based on sex is concerned. State laws clearly 
continue to permit risk classification in insurance.62  Thus, prohibitions on the use of gender in 
risk classification vary both by employment and non-employment status and by state versus 
federal law.63  Where employment-based coverage is concerned, Title VII appears to produce a 
more unified response, because it has been interpreted to bar both greater charges for one sex, as 
well as lesser-value benefits based on sex.64  As one observer has written, the standard of review 
is “not confined to asking whether male and female employees receive the same policy with 
identical terms; it instead compares how thoroughly that policy actually covers male and female 
enrollees’ medical expenses.”65  Title VII also prohibits discrimination based on “pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions.”66  
 
Age. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) offers only “meager”67 protection 
against discrimination in employee health benefits, since the Act explicitly permits employers to 
offer older workers lesser health benefits through the use of an “equal benefit or equal cost” 
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test.68  Thus, for example, EEOC regulations permit the provision of lesser benefits to Medicare-
age employees,69 essentially moving away from a notion of social solidarity and decisively 
toward actuarial fairness.   
 
Disability. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to employment,70 public 
programs,71 and public accommodations,72 while Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs.73  At the same time, civil rights laws 
prohibiting discrimination based on disability provide only limited protections.  Both Section 
504 and the ADA utilize a restrictive test for measuring who is protected, extending their reach 
only to “qualified persons with a disability”74 (a group known as “qualified handicapped 
persons” under Section 504).75  The concept of “qualified” is a narrow one, requiring the 
existence of a physical or mental impairment that restricts major life activities.76  Poor health 
status alone is not enough to trigger disability protections.  Furthermore, even if individuals 
satisfy the “qualified” test, they lose ADA employment protections under ADA Title I once they 
are no longer considered employed for purposes of ADA protection, even if they remain entitled 
to “COBRA continuation” health benefits under their ERISA health plans.77 Thus, ERISA itself 
would have to reclassify individuals as “employees” for purposes of continuation coverage for 
ADA principles to apply.  
 
Title II of the ADA and Section 504 reach public and federally assisted programs, respectively. 
However, these protections, as with the ADA’s public accommodation protections, are limited to 
access to coverage as well as to methods of administration that result in segregated and isolated 
treatment of persons with disabilities.78 (An interesting question is whether insurers in the 
individual market could absolutely bar enrollment based on health status, as many now do;79 
presumably the insurance “safe harbor” provisions of the ADA would permit such complete 
exclusionary practices if based on actuarially sound principles).80  Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court explicitly has interpreted Section 504 – the predecessor law to the ADA – as 
permitting state Medicaid agencies to apply across-the-board coverage limitations on all 
recipients, regardless of whether the impact of such limitations is felt disproportionately by 
qualified persons with handicaps as a result of their greater health needs.81  
 
Similarly, the public accommodations provisions of the ADA have been held not to reach the 
content of insurance.  Thus, private health insurers can single out certain conditions (e.g., 
HIV/AIDS) for complete or near-total coverage exclusion, so long as the exclusion applies to all 
plan members.  This very limited approach to what it means not to discriminate against qualified 
individuals has been upheld in a health insurance context even in cases in which, by its own 
admission, the insurer can offer no actuarial data to justify diagnosis based-discrimination.82  
Thus, despite rulings by the federal agencies to the contrary, courts have deferred to the concepts 
of actuarial fairness and risk classification, even where actuarial justification is absent, in 
apparent violation of the ADA’s insurance safe harbor, which permits differentiation only when 
actuarially justified.83  
 
In sum, the ADA (and where applicable, Section 504) may prevent employer-sponsored health 
plans, public insurers, and state regulated private insurers from refusing to sell products to or 
barring enrollment of qualified persons with disabilities.   And both laws would appear to bar 
administration practices that result in isolation and segregation.  But neither law prohibits content 
design (i.e. what is covered) that differentially affects persons with disabilities, nor does either 
law affect differential premiums.   
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B.  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)  
 
HIPAA establishes certain minimum standards for the design and operation of ERISA-governed 
health benefit plans, as well as state-regulated health insurance products in both the group and 
individual markets.  Its provisions establish certain limited protections as well as certain types of 
bars against discrimination based on health status.  Because its provisions focus on health status 
rather than disability, HIPAA has a potentially broader reach than the ADA.  At the same time, 
HIPAA, like the ADA and Section 504, does not reach the content of coverage, nor does it affect 
the ability of insurers selling in the individual market to charge differential premiums based on 
health status.  Thus, as with the ADA and Section 504, HIPAA’s protections apply only at the 
point of entry into coverage, not to the terms of coverage themselves.  HIPAA mandates only 
that provision be made to allow enrollment by certain people in poorer health status and that 
ERISA plans and group plans ensure identical treatment of persons in poorer health with respect 
to enrollment, coverage, and premiums.  
 
HIPAA amends ERISA, the Public Health Service (PHS) Act, and the Tax Code to reach 
ERISA-governed group health plans, whether self-insured or fully insured, as well as state-
regulated insurance products in the group market (and with respect to certain provisions, the 
individual market). 84   In effect, HIPAA sets a federal floor on state regulation of the small 
group market, with very limited provisions applicable to the individual market.85  
 
Guaranteed Issue and Renewability in the State-regulated Small Group and Individual 
Markets.  HIPAA defines a small group as one that has at least two but no more than 50 
employees on any business day during the preceding calendar year and that employs at least two 
persons on the first day of the plan year.86  At the same time, the small group definitions apply 
only to the extent that a state has not enacted an “alternative mechanism,” thereby permitting 
states to essentially devise their own methods for complying with HIPAA’s small group 
standards.87  The small group standards have as their centerpiece guaranteed issue, meaning that 
insurers operating in the market must accept every group that applies for coverage, as well as 
every individual within each group.88  Even so, insurers may impose minimum contribution and 
participation requirements as long as they do not selectively offer their approved products to 
different employer groups.89  
 
Guaranteed issue requirements also apply in the individual market, but in a particularly limited 
way; the protections apply only to applicants who have not experienced more than a 63-day 
break in coverage, have exhausted COBRA or other continuation coverage, previously had at 
least 18 months of creditable coverage,90 are ineligible for any other coverage, and have not 
committed fraud or been terminated for nonpayment of premiums.91  Thus, only a fraction of all 
persons who might need guaranteed issue in the individual market would qualify for such a 
protection under the terms of the statute.   
 
The guaranteed issue provisions are accompanied by guaranteed renewal requirements, but as 
with guaranteed issue, the guarantees come with constraints, including the right of insurers to 
terminate based on “noncompliance with material plan provisions”92 or movement of employees 
away from the area covered by a plan’s provider network in the case of networked plans.93  In 
other words, the issuer would not have to adjust its network to assure access in the event that 
group members move.  The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal 
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agency that administers HIPAA under the PHS Act, interprets discontinuances, terminations, and 
non-renewal to cover rescissions.94  Similar renewal rules apply in the individual insurance 
market.95   
 
HIPAA’s reach is further limited by its terms of enforcement; the law gives states several basic 
compliance options, with limited to no federal oversight of the operation of whether state 
alternatives satisfy HIPAA’s requirements.  Under HIPAA, states can adopt and enforce federal 
requirements; alternatively they can have the federal government enforce HIPAA requirements 
for them.96  Yet another alternative – elected by 48 states as of Fall 2007 – is to establish 
“alternative mechanisms” for achieving compliance.97  There appears to be a vacuum of federal 
oversight regarding the extent to which states’ alternative models satisfy HIPAA,98 despite the 
fact that the alternative mechanisms must be cleared by CMS in order to ensure that all 
“federally eligible”99 individuals enjoy guaranteed issue protections. 
 
States that elect to establish an alternative mechanism in the individual market can offer a high 
risk pool (much like a bad driver pool in the case of auto insurance).  News accounts suggest that 
the cost of high risk pools appears to be so prohibitive as to be virtually financially 
inaccessible.100  Furthermore, recent litigation involving insurer rescissions in the individual 
market underscore the limited nature of federal oversight of HIPAA’s guaranteed issue 
requirement.101   
 
Prohibiting Pre-Existing Condition Exclusions.  In order to address issues of portability (that is, 
being able to change jobs without fear of a wholesale or partial exclusion from a subsequent 
plan), HIPAA provides certain prohibitions against pre-existing condition exclusions.  As with 
guaranteed issue, however, the term is defined narrowly under federal law as “a condition, either 
physical or mental, for which medical advice was recommended or received within a six-month 
period ending on the enrollment date.”102  This definition thus can exclude longstanding 
conditions that were not recently treated (e.g., cancer that was successfully treated and that has 
been in remission for years).  Furthermore, the prohibition applies only to persons who have 
“creditable coverage” and who obtain new coverage within 63 days of losing “creditable 
coverage.”103  Rules for calculating when creditable coverage exists and its duration are 
extensive.104  Furthermore, HIPAA offers no protection for newly eligible plan members without 
previous creditable coverage.  Health benefit plans and insurers can impose up to a 12-month 
pre-existing condition exclusion (which may be longer under certain circumstances),105 except in 
the case of pregnancy, the addition of a newborn child, or a newly adopted child within 30 days 
of adoption.106   
 
Access to Coverage: Prohibition against Health Status Discrimination. HIPAA’s central 
purpose was to eliminate health status considerations from eligibility for coverage or from the 
cost of coverage in the group market.  HIPAA thus prohibits certain types of discriminatory 
actions by ERISA-governed plans and state regulated issuers of group health insurance (the non-
discrimination provisions do not apply to the individual market).107  The range of prohibited 
conduct spans enrollment, effective date of coverage, waiting periods, late and special 
enrollment rules, eligibility for benefit packages, benefits (both cost sharing and benefit 
restrictions), continued eligibility, and coverage termination.108  Specific prohibited bases of 
discrimination include health status, medical health condition (mental or physical), claims 
experience, the receipt of care, medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, and 
disability.109  
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Thus, HIPAA prohibits differential treatment in enrollment or coverage in the case of ERISA 
health benefit plans and products sold in the state regulated group health insurance market.  At 
the same time, HIPAA does not reach content (i.e. what is covered) nor premium cost, so as 
enrollment barriers are removed for members of groups or benefit plans, premiums can rise and 
coverage can shrink.  Hence the paradox of non-discrimination prohibition that are 
unaccompanied by minimum content and cost-sharing requirements as well as limits on the 
amount of financial liability for premiums facing individuals and families.  
 
Although HIPAA bars discrimination, the law does not prohibit an employer or insurer from 
offering premium discounts or modified cost sharing in exchange for participation in a bona fide 
wellness program.110  In other words, HIPAA allows rewards for participation in health 
promotion programs that are part of a group health plan as long as the reward is not tied to a 
particular health factor and is available to all similarly situated employees.  Thus, a plan could 
reward employees who undergo a risk assessment upon enrollment (or penalize those who do 
not), but cannot reward only plan participants whose participation results in lowered cholesterol 
levels. Federal regulations also permit “benign discrimination,”111 that is, provision of a reward 
targeted to individuals with certain conditions, such as rewarding persons with diabetes for 
participating in a disease management program, as long as the reward is not conditioned on the 
achievement of a certain outcome.112  
 
Whether wellness policies ultimately serve to discriminate against persons in poor health by 
penalizing them for their failure to aggressively take charge of their health remains to be seen.113  
Paradoxically of course, the widespread use of wellness programs in an era of shrinking 
coverage ultimately may help illustrate the shortcomings of the current approach to non-
discrimination.  Suppose that a self treatment plan for diabetes recommends frequent and 
comprehensive podiatric care, an important and effective treatment for persons with serious 
diabetes that can avert the loss of limbs.  Then imagine that the plan limits or excludes podiatric 
care.  Could a plan member be penalized for failing to follow a self-care protocol while 
simultaneously being denied coverage for the evidence-based treatment in question?   
 
C.  The Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA)  
 
The Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA) amplifies HIPAA’s non-
discrimination rules by prohibiting employee health benefit plans and state regulated insurers 
from using genetic information to determine eligibility for coverage, a prohibition extended to 
both the group and individual markets.114  GINA goes beyond HIPAA, however, in prohibiting 
the use of such information to determine the level of premiums to be charged in the case of both 
ERISA governed health plans and the state regulated group and individual markets.115  Both 
individual medical underwriting of applicants and the purchase of aggregate data are 
prohibited.116  In this sense, GINA can be seen as a further incremental movement toward the 
concept of social solidarity in its prohibition against risk classification based on a dormant, but 
immutable health status marker.  At the same time, GINA does not bar medical underwriting 
based on current health status, nor does it affect the content of coverage.117  
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D.  Mental Health Parity  
 
The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, included 
in the Wall Street rescue plan passed by Congress in 2008,118 addresses the issue of coverage 
discrimination based on health status to a limited degree, even as it preserves the power of health 
plans and insurers to either entirely exclude coverage of mental illness conditions or impose 
stringent medical management limits on coverage in ways far different from techniques used in 
the design and administration of physical health conditions and treatments.  Amending ERISA, 
the Tax Code, and the PHS Act, mental health parity extends the concept of parity (which 
previously barred only the use of lifetime and annual financial caps on mental health benefits) to 
reach “predominant”119 “financial requirements” and “treatment limitations” more generally.  In 
other words, the Act ensures that financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to 
mental health/substance use disorder benefits are no more restrictive than those requirements and 
limitations placed on medical/surgical benefits.  The term “financial requirement” is expanded to 
include deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance;120 the term “treatment limitation” includes 
“limits on the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or other similar limits 
on the scope or duration of treatment.”121  In addition, the legislation establishes at least some 
level expectation of parity in access to out-of-network providers, requiring a level of parity “that 
is consistent with the requirements of this section.”122 
 
At the same time, while the legislation requires disclosure of medical necessity criteria,123 it does 
not compel parity in definitions and terms, such as those that define the medical necessity of 
care, unless such terms fall within the revised meaning of parity.124  As a result, the legislation 
does not appear to prohibit coverage techniques that embed practice guidelines into coverage, 
such as “acute short term hospitalization for addiction,” and that avoid express numerical limits.  
Thus, parity does not appear to prevent a more granular approach to mental illness and addiction 
coverage, one that embeds precise, permissible treatments into coverage documents, even while 
using more broad-based coverage terms for other conditions.   
 
How the parity amendments are interpreted of course remains to be seen, but the embedding of 
pre-set practice guidelines into the terms of coverage is vastly different in structure and 
consequence from traditional insurance design practices.  In ERISA coverage cases involving 
physical health care,125 the contract specifies broad covered benefit classes, with delegation of 
decision-making discretion to the insurer or plan administrator to decide whether particular 
treatments are covered (i.e., fall within the enumerated classes) and medically necessary for a 
particular patient.  In these cases, the subject of an appeal is the extent to which the insurer may 
have abused its discretion in applying broad coverage terms to a particular case.126  By contrast, 
coverage documents that employ embedded treatment guidelines fix the treatment as a contract 
term, thereby eliminating the right to appeal, since challenges to plan design itself are 
impermissible under ERISA.127   
 
The implications for mental illness and addiction treatment are revealed in an important case128 
that involved a beneficiary challenge to plan coverage limitations that, in her view, restricted 
treatment for her addiction to levels too low to achieve results.  She appealed for additional 
coverage in the form of a longer treatment program.  The treatment that had been authorized by 
the plan was expressed, not as an administrator’s discretionary decision applying broad benefit 
classes, but instead as a specified “condition/treatment” pair that was enumerated within the 
terms of the contract itself. That is, the contract specified treatments much in the way that a 
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plan’s prescription drug component specifies coverage in the form of a prescribed drug 
formulary.  As a result, the plan administrator essentially was stripped of its discretion to cover 
more services even if necessary and the claimant had no appeals rights because the limitations 
were fixed by contract rather than discretionary.  In effect, the contractual specification of 
treatment essentially nullified the need for an individualized medical necessity determination, 
since coverage consisted of defined treatments rather than a plan design requiring individualized, 
fact-driven decision-making.  
 
By not incorporating parity in medical necessity into its provisions, the 2008 parity legislation 
does not appear to change plan discretion to use a more granular fixed concept of medical 
necessity that utilizes a fixed approach to identifying and covering medically necessary mental 
health treatment.  Thus, not only does the legislation allow plans and insurers to entirely exclude 
conditions from coverage, but furthermore, the law appears to permit insurers to designate 
covered medically necessary treatments contractually and without according plan administrators 
the discretion to make individualized coverage determinations within broader benefit classes.  
The physical health analogy to this approach to coverage would be exclusion of certain cancers 
from coverage entirely and the specification of covered cancer treatments without giving the plan 
administrator the discretion to recognize individual variation and tailor coverage accordingly.   
 
It may be that the approach taken to mental health coverage signals the general direction of 
coverage in an evolving health care system in which financing is more closely aligned with 
evidence-based treatments.  For the time being, the parity legislation tolerates differences in 
approach to coverage design (i.e., what is covered) and plan administration in a medical 
necessity context.   
 
E.  Newborns and Mothers Protection Act  
 
As with other acts within this collection of laws, the Newborns and Mothers Protection Act 
amends the Tax Code, ERISA, and the PHS Act, reaching both the state regulated group market 
and employer plans subject to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (15 employees or more).129  
Covered plans and issuers must provide a minimum of 48 hours stay following a normal 
delivery, and 96 hours following a C-section130 (an earlier discharge may occur if recommended 
by the health care provider). The Act also addresses other dimensions of parity, such as 
prohibiting plans from denying enrollment, renewal or continued coverage to mothers or 
newborns covered by the Act or penalize providers that comply with the Act or incentivize them 
to shorten the length of stay.131 
 
F.  Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act (WHCRA) 
 
Amending ERISA, the Tax Code, and the PHS Act, WHCRA applies to group health plans that 
provide mastectomy benefits, requiring plans to cover breast reconstruction, prostheses, and 
other treatments to address the complications of all stages of a mastectomy.132  As with the 
Newborns and Mothers Protection Act, WHCRA prohibits retaliation against providers or the 
exclusion of persons protected by the Act.  
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G.  ERISA Regulations Governing Full and Fair Review of Claims Denials  
 
As this section describes, ERISA has been revised on several occasions to address certain types 
of health plan conduct in connection with enrollment and coverage.  COBRA continuation 
benefits are one example and the amendments noted above offer other examples.  In addition, 
regulations promulgated in 2000 in order to revise the “full and fair hearing” provisions of 
ERISA by establishing more speed and transparency to reviews of health coverage denials, may 
have some effect on improved access to benefits by persons in poor health status.  At the same 
time, the rate at which appeals take place appears to be very low, and as a result, the impact of 
changes in the fair process laws may be limited. 133  
 
III. Proposed Legal Solutions 
 
This analysis reviews the problem of discrimination on the basis of health status, as well as the 
series of laws that have attempted to address the problem.  The focus of this analysis is on 
federal law; many states have enacted similar laws that parallel these federal themes.134 Taken 
together, the federal legal environment indicates a growing interest in mitigating discrimination, 
particularly at the point of enrollment into coverage.  But this review also underscores the limited 
nature of these protections and the degree to which federal policy has yet to focus on reforms 
that affect the design and content of coverage itself.  Indeed, by zeroing in on lifting “entry-
point” discrimination, the laws may have inadvertently triggered efforts by health plans and 
insurers to move toward the use of greater risk shielding techniques in relation to coverage itself, 
including higher cost sharing, thinner benefits, a specified contractual approach to coverage 
decisions that removes the discretion to allow treatment as a matter of individualized medical 
judgment (especially in the case of certain conditions considered risky), and the greater use of 
“macro-level” treatment exclusions.  Put another way, reducing discrimination against the sick at 
the front end may have resulted in greater discrimination against those who do manage to enroll, 
thereby triggering a rapid escalation in the proportion of under-insured persons.  
 
Federal laws outlining minimum coverage requirements, such as those aimed at improving 
coverage for certain conditions (pregnancy, newborn inpatient stays, breast cancer), nibble 
around the edges of coverage design.  Furthermore, laws aimed at ensuring guaranteed entry into 
coverage arrangements contain numerous limitations and loopholes, such as non-discrimination 
on the basis of pre-existing conditions that restricts its reach to persons who have not recently 
been in treatment (within 6 months), or who have continuous and unbroken coverage (an 
impossible bar for persons who have lost employment because of illness, given the attendant 
effects of job loss on income).  Indeed, COBRA, which ostensibly permits former employees 
who are sick to remain members of their plans, carries an unsubsidized premium that makes it all 
but unattainable to the very people in need of continuation coverage.  Disability law is of limited 
utility, because the definition of who is a qualified person with a disability is narrow.  
Furthermore, the ADA and Section 504 have been interpreted as not reaching the content of 
coverage; even if this limiting interpretation were to be reversed, the ADA’s “insurance safe 
harbor provision” (as well as courts’ willingness to waive the need for even a remotely colorable 
actuarial justification of a claim of elevated financial risk)135 means that even qualified persons 
with disabilities gain no protection from the law.  
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Devising a solution to this problem in a health care system that largely rests on market principles 
of actuarial fairness is not simple, since the heart of actuarial fairness is distinction based on 
health status.  However, certain reforms, outlined below, could be expected to have important 
mitigating effects.  
 
A.  The Legal Establishment of a Nationwide Group Purchasing Mechanism  
 
Currently few legal mechanisms exist for creating groups in the marketplace outside of 
employment; furthermore, most employee groups are too small to be sufficiently robust in 
relation to the financial risk of illness. As a result, the illness of a few typically leads to 
escalating premiums unless the sick are pushed out (a seemingly endless process until no one is 
left in the group).  Small and mid-sized employers, like individuals, are essentially micro-groups.  
Even large and jumbo employers are, in the vast scheme of things, limited pooling arrangements 
where health risks are concerned, given an aging population and the relatively poor health profile 
of far too many Americans.   
 
Thus, the most basic step in crafting a legal solution to discrimination is enactment of new 
federal legislation to establish a nationwide purchasing group, much in the way Massachusetts’ 
health reform plan establishes a state-level group.  The argument for a national group – like that 
which undergirds the Federal Employee Health Benefits Plan or the Medicare Part D prescription 
drug program – is its sheer size and ability to sustain financial risk.  State pools, such as the one 
in Massachusetts, might be feasible for large states with relatively healthy populations, but less 
so for smaller states with older populations or populations in relatively poor health.  Legislation 
to establish a nationwide purchasing group (which of course could be subdivided into state or 
regional purchasing markets) resolves this distributional issue while also preventing insurers 
from selecting state-based markets with healthier populations and thus, lower risk. 
 
As the insurance industry already points out in its own health reform recommendations,136 
compulsory enrollment is a crucial precondition to the ability to eliminate barriers to enrollment 
tied to health status in order to prevent adverse selection.  Presumably therefore, legislation to 
establish the pool would also provide for guaranteed issue and renewal, a total bar against pre-
existing condition exclusions, and bars against discrimination in access to coverage based on 
health status.  Unlike existing HIPAA standards as noted above, the legislative standards 
established for a nationwide group could be defined to eliminate the restrictions and limitations 
that dilute HIPAA’s current effectiveness (e.g., the ability to exclude certain pre-existing 
conditions from coverage).   
 
In a fully realized version of this legislative approach, all Americans could be automatically 
enrolled in a national purchasing pool, with opt-out provisions for those covered through 
employer-sponsored plans or other remaining forms of “creditable coverage.”137 Enrollment into 
the pool could be supported through income-related subsidies (a combination of taxes and direct 
payments) that would cover the cost of enrollment, with collection of premiums a function of the 
federal tax system coupled with alternative payment mechanisms for individuals who do not pay 
taxes.   
 
In the case of employers who desire to retain their own coverage arrangements, the national 
purchasing pool could serve as a reinsurance mechanism in order to protect employer groups 
against high losses for covered benefits. This use of the federal pooling mechanism would permit 
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employers (whether ERISA governed or exempt as in the case of public employers) to utilize the 
pool as a reinsurance mechanism, with a legislatively established “attachment point” (i.e., the 
point at which reinsurance coverage begins).138 
 
In the case of individuals whose coverage is derived directly from the pool, the legislation also 
could provide for payment of risk-adjusted premiums to participating plans, thereby utilizing 
actuarial experience not as a means of excluding or limiting coverage, but as a mechanism for 
recognizing the realities of different health status at the point of distribution among participating 
plans.  
 
A further consequence of a national pool would be elimination of the need for an individual 
market.  If a nationwide purchasing pool is made available to all persons as a matter of law, then 
there is no need for an individual market, which by definition exists to discriminate, since all 
persons seeking coverage through the individual market are effectively a high risk. 
 
B. Minimum Participation Standards for Sellers of Health Benefit Services Products; Non-
Discrimination Against the Sick in Coverage Design and Coverage Determinations; Non-
Discrimination in Provider Payment and Network Formation 
 
Whether selling to individuals insured through the pool or through an employer reinsured 
through the pool, entities that seek to sell health benefit products could be required to meet 
coverage standards.  Those standards presumably would include a benefit design pegged to the 
Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan or another widely purchased “benchmark” plan, an 
approach similar to that used in the case of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program.139  At 
the same time, the current minimum coverage standards applicable to ERISA plans (e.g., 
pregnancy non-discrimination, coverage of mothers and newborns, coverage of women with 
breast cancer, and mental health parity) could be applied to all products sold through the pool, 
whether directly or to employers reinsured through the pool, with cost sharing similarly 
regulated.  
 
A far more complex question relates to how to address the phenomenon discussed previously: 
coverage design approaches that discriminate through exclusion of recognized medical 
conditions and the use of contractual treatment strategies for other conditions in order to avoid 
insurer discretion to authorize more expansive or alternative coverage. This bifurcated approach 
to coverage design – broad classes and medical discretion for some conditions, total exclusion of 
other conditions, and non-discretionary contractual treatments for still others – is inherently 
discriminatory based on health status.  
 
One plausible answer is that, in fact, coverage generally is moving toward the designation of 
conditions and treatments and the elimination of medical discretion, particularly as evidence 
builds regarding the effectiveness of treatment.  If this is the case – that is, if coverage design for 
both physical and mental conditions increasingly resembles a specified formulary – then the 
most logical response would be the enactment of standards that permit this evolution to occur 
while simultaneously enacting laws barring the exclusion of any recognized medical condition 
and creating an exceptions process for recognized conditions for which the recognized treatment 
is inappropriate.  While contractual condition/treatment pairings may ultimately serve 
population-wide interests, a small but significant proportion of the population have complex 
conditions that simply do not fit neatly into recognized condition/treatment pairs.  Without a 
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legal remedy, these individuals and their treating professionals face the difficult choice of either 
accepting coverage for inappropriate treatment or alternatively, going without coverage at all.   
 
In order to guard against such an outcome, one legal option is to include in the legislated 
coverage standards an “exception” system similar to the exceptions process that is an element of 
the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit program.140  This process allows coverage 
exceptions to gain access to medically necessary prescription drugs not covered under Part D 
plans’ formulary for individuals whose need for appropriate treatment is not satisfied through the 
standard formulary design.  A national coverage arrangement could provide a similar exceptions 
process, permitting coverage for  “extra contractual” treatments based on specified evidence such 
as the clinical judgment of treating professionals, evidence gleaned from the health services 
research literature and studies, and expert opinion.  In reviewing a request for an exception, 
presumably a discretionary review standard paralleling the current ERISA fiduciary standard 
would apply;141 to further militate against arbitrary denials, the internal review process could be 
coupled with an independent external appeals system permitting an impartial de novo external 
review, followed by limited judicial review based on the record.  This approach has been utilized 
by Congress previously in so called “patients’ bill of rights” legislation,142 which has not been 
considered since 2001, but whose provisions are highly relevant to any effort to develop 
procedural mechanisms governing claims determinations.  
 
A further measure of reform would be to require the development of risk-adjusted payment 
methodologies, not just to plans selected by enrollees, but also with respect to provider 
payments, in order to incentivize higher or more intensive levels of care for patients whose 
underlying conditions require a more complex level of care.  For example, filling a cavity for a 
healthy 10-year-old with no other health conditions other than cavities may bear little or no 
practical relationship to filling a cavity for a 10-year-old who also has serious autism.  Dental 
treatment is necessary for both children, but the resemblance in terms of time and resources may 
end there.  In addition, legal safeguards would be required to ensure that providers with 
experience in the treatment of patients with complex conditions are not arbitrarily excluded from 
coverage networks as an indirect means of shielding plans against higher risk patients.  
 
C.  Medicaid Reforms  
 
As noted, Medicaid plays a vital role in a market based system that differentiates among 
individuals based on health status with respect to both coverage and care.  The question is 
whether Medicaid remains equally essential in a world in which all persons are enrolled in a 
common purchasing arrangement.  One approach would be to retain Medicaid for those 
individuals who meet its conditions, that is, to segregate these individuals from the broader pool. 
The benefit of this approach is protection of the larger pool from higher health risks.  The 
downside is, of course, the impact of such segregation on Medicaid beneficiaries.  While 
coverage is broad and cost-sharing is highly controlled, Medicaid provider participation levels 
are extremely low, chiefly because of very low payment rates.143  Whether to continue to 
segregate low income persons in a separate risk pool thus becomes a pressing matter in a health 
care quality context.  
 
Certainly Congress could amend the Medicaid statute to create far more explicit standards than 
those that currently apply in order to ensure that payment levels are sufficient to ensure equality 
of health care access.144 Another legal option however, would be to retain Medicaid as a source 
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of coverage for what commonly is termed “long-term care,” that is, community and institutional 
services and supplies that are essential to maintaining health and averting deterioration among 
children and adults with highly advanced health care needs.  Even in a broad pooling 
arrangement such as the one proposed here, with uniform and regulated coverage standards and 
safeguards against discrimination, it is likely that the coverage design will not encompass those 
classes of services that extend beyond services connected with comprehensive primary care, such 
as treatment for acute physical and mental conditions, and the routine management of certain 
types of chronic health conditions such as diabetes, cardiovascular disease, asthma, mild to 
moderate depression, and other conditions amenable to modern “disease management” 
techniques. 145 
 
However, a small portion of the population experiences conditions of sufficient duration and 
severity to require more intensive types of health care and supportive services on an ongoing 
basis, examples of which include nursing facility services, personal care services, specialized 
forms of durable medical equipment, private duty nursing care, habilitation services, long term 
rehabilitation, specialized case management, and other forms of care that extend beyond the 
furthest reaches of even a generous insurance policy.  Medicaid’s strength is its coverage of 
service classes that have no counterpart in traditional health insurance,146 and over four decades, 
the program has become the nation’s predominant source of health care financing for these 
services.  Even if Congress were to enact a national purchasing pool with strong non-
discrimination standards with respect to both enrollment and coverage of the type visualized 
here, it is likely that the pool would exclude items and services at the long-term care end of the 
health care spectrum, much as Medicare does not cover long-term care.   
 
In order to ensure that persons with advanced health care needs are covered for long-term care, 
Medicaid could be amended to provide long-term care coverage for persons who receive 
standard coverage through the pool (either directly or as a function of participation in a reinsured 
employer-sponsored plan).  Eligibility could be conditioned on a need for long-term care services 
as a result of a specified level of functional limitation, a model that has been used previously by 
Congress to establish Medicaid coverage for persons in need of long-term care.147   This tiered 
approach to coverage could finance items and services  needed by children and adults with 
special health care needs, such as school-based intensive health care services for children 
receiving early intervention or special education, specialized care for children receiving services 
through the child welfare system, children and adults with severe mental and emotional 
disorders, and persons who experience significant limitations of daily activities and who require 
specialized care in community or institutional settings.   
 
As with previous Medicaid initiatives targeted at assisting persons with significant disabilities, 
enrollment could be income-related.148  As with the current Medicaid program, the model of 
administration could remain one of state administration subject to federal requirements regarding 
eligibility, enrollment, coverage, quality oversight, and plan administration.  In essence, under 
this proposal, Medicaid would evolve into a funder of long-term care services for the population, 
with a nationwide purchasing pool for the non-elderly population employed to furnish a more 
standard range of health care needs.  
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Concluding Thoughts: Short Term Reforms  
 
The solutions laid out here take a long term view of the problem of discrimination, with an eye 
toward the system evolution envisioned in President Obama’s campaign health reform proposals.  
That system depends on the establishment of a national health insurance exchange for purposes 
of guaranteeing accessible and affordable coverage.  This analysis lends additional justification 
for such an approach, since moving in the direction of a nationwide coverage arrangement also 
mitigates discriminatory enrollment and coverage practices.  In such a reformed system, 
Medicaid also could be reconfigured to focus on the population’s long-term health care needs.  
 
Of course, achieving this type of evolution is viewed as a lengthy process. What interim steps 
might be taken to provide more immediate legal relief?   
 
 Congress might amend HIPAA to strengthen its protections against exclusion based on 
pre-existing condition, by repealing the current treatment exception.   
 Congress also could strengthen its guaranteed issue provisions to eliminate the 
continuous coverage requirement.   
 Congress also might incentivize states to establish Massachusetts-like group markets by 
enacting stop-loss protections in states that elect to establish state-based risk pools, which 
in turn would also obviate the need for the individual insurance market. Federal stop-loss 
could contain protections against discrimination and exclusion in enrollment, with states 
given more latitude to design coverage.  
 Congress might also enact legislation to finance COBRA, thereby enabling more 
individuals with serious health conditions to retain their attachment to an employer 
group, not only as a means of deriving coverage but in order to protect guaranteed issue 
rights. 
 In addition to extending coverage to low income adults, Congress might create a new 
state Medicaid eligibility option to extend Medicaid coverage to any child or adult who 
has been rejected from the individual insurance market or whose premiums exceed 5% of 
gross family income on an annualized basis.  This option might be in addition to or in lieu 
of state risk pool legislation, and would use Medicaid to achieve coverage of individuals 
with pre-existing conditions who are not connected to a group, and thus who require 
entry into the individual market. The benefit of this approach is readily available federal 
financial participation (which could be enhanced), strong coverage, and controlled cost-
sharing.  The shortcoming, as noted previously, is the health care access barriers faced by 
recipients.  Nonetheless, Medicaid has been demonstrated to have a powerful impact on 
access to health care, and as an interim step holds much promise as an alternative to the 
current individual market.  
 
Finally, there are steps that could be taken administratively to reduce insurance discrimination 
based on health status.  In implementing mental health parity, the United States Departments of 
Health and Human Services, Treasury, and Labor could impose limits on the extent to which 
insurers and plans can utilize treatment limits that differentiate between covered physical and 
mental health conditions in terms of the extent to which additional coverage can be authorized 
when medically necessary.  While the 2008 amendments do in fact permit discrimination in the 
form of condition exclusions, the question of whether plans and insurers can use fixed treatments 
for mental conditions while more flexible approaches for physical conditions remains an open 
one.   
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Furthermore, the federal government could be far more robust in overseeing state compliance 
with HIPAA’s non-discrimination and guaranteed issue requirements in the state regulated health 
insurance markets.  The evidence suggests that state high-risk pools are inaccessible, thereby 
calling into question states’ reliance on such pools in lieu of implementation of HIPAA’s 
protective standards.  This suggests the need for conditions for high risk pools, in order to 
guarantee that such pools do not become a subterfuge for HIPAA non-compliance.  
 
What appears a far less viable remedy – either in the short term or long term – is a solution that 
relies on the use of high risk pools.  In concept, such pools have some attraction, because they 
arguably offer a means of achieving coverage for persons unable to secure insurance through 
“mainstream” plans.  Risk pools, however, have the potential to isolate the sick into costly and 
separate coverage arrangements; furthermore, they can incentivize markets to be more 
discriminatory in both access and coverage, on the theory that a high risk pool will be there to 
catch those who are excluded.  In the end, high risk pooling appears to be an approach whose 
effect is to exclude the sick and those who fall outside an artificially defined health norm.  With 
the potential for an ever-shifting concept of what a healthy norm is, a high risk pool cannot 
address the reality of how people’s health can change.  An individual in good health today can 
become the person with cancer tomorrow.  In order to provide an effective means of financing 
appropriate health care, which is the whole point of the enterprise after all, health insurance must 
recognize the oftentimes fleeting nature of good health, and must provide for stable coverage 
arrangements that can assure access to appropriate care both in good health and bad. 
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